Senator Jack Reed (Democrat - Rhode Island) Voting Record -- Impeachment Trial of William (Bill) Jefferson Clinton

Statement Taken From U.S. Senate Web Site February 25, 1999

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
February 11, 1999

Statement of Senator Jack Reed regarding the Vote on the Articles of Impeachment February 11, 1999

Below is a written statement similar to the comments Senator Reed will make on the floor of the Senate during today's impeachment deliberations.

For the past six weeks, the Senate has been engaged as a Court of Impeachment to try President William Jefferson Clinton -- the first trial of an elected President in the history of the United States. Our deliberations will bring to a close more than a year of controversy which has left the American people both frustrated and dismayed. And, hopefully, our decision will serve as the means of rededicating the energies of our Government to the service of the American people.

In this endeavor, our solemn duty to the Constitution is paramount.

Conscious of these responsibilities and based on the evidence in the record, the arguments of the House Managers and the counsels for the President, I conclude as follows. The President has disgraced himself and dishonored his office. He has offended the justified expectations of the American people that the Presidency must be above the sordid episodes revealed in the record before us. However, the House Managers failed to establish that the President's conduct amounts to "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" requiring his removal from office in accordance with the Constitution. Moreover, the House Managers also failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the allegations in the Article would constitute the crimes of perjury or obstruction of justice.

The Constitutional grounds for Impeachment, "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors", indicate both the severity of the offenses necessary for removal and the essential political character of these offenses. The clarity of "Treason" and "Bribery" is without doubt. No more heinous example of a offense against the Constitutional order exits than betrayal of the nation to an enemy or betrayal of duty for personal enrichment. With these offenses as predicate, it follows that "other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" must likewise be restricted to serious offenses that strike at the heart of the Constitutional order.

Certainly, this is the view of Alexander Hamilton; one of the trio of authors of the Federalist Papers which is the most respected and authoritative interpretation of the Constitution. In Federalist No. 65, Hamilton describes impeachable offenses as "those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself."

This view is sustained with remarkable consistency by other contemporaries of Hamilton. George Mason, a delegate to the Federal Constitutional Convention, declared that "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" refer to "great and dangerous offenses" or "attempts to subvert the Constitution." James Iredell, a delegate to the North Carolina Convention which ratified the Constitution and later a Justice of the United States Supreme Court, stated during the Convention debates:

The power of impeachment is given by this Constitution, to bring great offenders to punishment. . . . This power is lodged in those who represent the great body of the people, because the occasion for its exercise will arise from acts of great injury to the community, and the objects of it may be such as cannot be easily reached by an ordinary tribunal.

Iredell sustains the view that an impeachable offense must cause "great injury to the community." These interpretations strongly indicate that private wrongdoing, without a significant, adverse effect upon the nation, does not constitute an impeachable offense.

Later commentators expressed similar views. In 1833, Justice Story quoted favorably from the scholarship of William Rawle in which Rawle concluded that the "legitimate causes of impeachment...can have reference only to public character, and official duty.... In general, those offenses, which may be committed equally by a private person, as a public officer, are not the subject of impeachment."

This line of reasoning was manifest in the careful and thoughtful work of the House of Representatives during the Watergate proceedings in 1974. The Democratic staff of the House Judiciary Committee concluded that

[b]ecause impeachment of a President is a grave step for the nation, it is to be predicated only upon conduct seriously incompatible with either the constitutional form and principles of our government or the proper performance of constitutional duties of [the President's] office.

This view was echoed by many of the Republican members of the Judiciary Committee when they declared:

the Framers . . . were concerned with preserving the government from being overthrown by the treachery or corruption of one man . . . [I]t is our judgment, based upon this constitutional history, that the Framers of the United States Constitution intended that the President should be removable by the legislative branch only for serious misconduct dangerous to the system of government.

This authoritative commentary on the meaning of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" is supported by the structure of the Constitution which makes Impeachment independent from the operation of the criminal justice system. Regardless of the outcome of an Impeachment Trial, the accused " shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law." The independence of the Impeachment process from the prosecution of crimes underscores the function of Impeachment as a means to remove a President from office, not because of criminal behavior, but because the President poses a threat to the Constitutional order. Criminal behavior is not irrelevant to an Impeachment, but it only becomes decisive if that behavior imperils the balance of power established in the Constitution.

The House Managers argue that we should apply the same reasoning to the removal of the President that we have applied to the trial of Federal judges. They make their argument with particular urgency in regard to Article I and its allegations of perjury since several judges have been removed for perjury.

This reasoning disregards the unique position of the President. The President is elected and popular elections are a compelling check on Presidential conduct. No such "popular check" was imposed on the Judiciary. They are deliberately insulated from the public pressures of the moment to ensure their independence to follow the law and not a changeable public mood. As such, impeachment is the only means of removing a judge. And, the removal of one of the 839 Federal judges can never have the traumatic effect of the removal of the President. To suggest that a Presidential impeachment and a judicial impeachment should be treated identically strains credulity.

Moreover, the Constitution requires that judicial service be conditioned on "good Behavior". This adds a further dimension to the consideration of the removal of a judge from office. Although "good Behavior" is not a separate grounds for impeachment, this Constitutional standard thoroughly permeates any evaluation of judicial conduct. Judges are subject to the most exacting code of conduct in both their public life and their private life. Without diminishing the expectations of Presidential conduct, it is fair to say that we expect and demand a more scrupulous standard of conduct, particularly personal conduct, from judges.

The House Managers' argument is ultimately unpersuasive. Rather than reflexively importing prior decisions dealing with judicial impeachments, we are obliged to consider the President's behavior in the context of his unique Constitutional duties and without the condition to his tenure of "good Behavior".

Authoritative commentary on the Constitution, together with the structure of the Constitution allowing independent consideration of criminal charges, makes it clear that the term, "high Crimes and Misdemeanors", encompasses conduct which involves the President in the impermissible exercise of the powers of his office to upset the Constitutional order. Moreover, since the essence of impeachment is removal from office rather than punishment for offenses, there is a strong inference that the improper conduct must represent a continuing threat to the people and the Constitution, and not simply an episode that either can be dealt with in the Courts or raises no generalized concerns about the continued service of the President.

Measured against this Constitutional standard, the allegations against the President do not constitute "high Crimes and Misdemeanors." The uncontradicted facts of the case paint a sordid picture of the President's involvement in a clandestine, consensual affair with a young woman. His attempts to disguise this affair collided with the Jones lawsuit; a lawsuit filed against him in his capacity as a private citizen, and not in anyway directed at his conduct as President. Over many months, he mislead and he dissembled about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. He lied to his family, he lied to his colleagues, and, on January 26, 1998, he lied to the American people. All of these lies were designed to disguise his illicit but consensual relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Only after being compelled to testify before a Federal Grand Jury in August of 1998, did the President finally admit his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.

The House Managers take this tale of deception and betrayal, more soap opera than high drama of State, and urge that it rises to behavior evidencing an impermissible exercise of his powers as President or an impermissible failure to discharge his duties as President which threatens the Constitutional balance of government and can only be remedied by the removal of the President. They urge too much. The allegations, even construed in the most favorable light to the House Managers, do not constitute "high Crimes and misdemeanors" as that term has been consistently interpreted over the course of American history.

One could confidently stop at this point and reach a judgment to acquit the President. Such a judgment does not forgive the disreputable behavior of the President. Rather, it does, as it must, keep faith with the Constitution.

However, to stop at this juncture and ignore the allegations of criminal conduct could leave several misperceptions. First, such an approach could be criticized as failing to afford the House of Representatives its appropriate recognition as the proponent of Articles of Impeachment. The House of Representatives acted in the discharge of its exclusive Constitutional prerogative to Impeach the President. They cast these Articles as criminal violations, and due deference must be given to the decision of the House. Second, failing to examine the allegations of criminal conduct may leave the erroneous impression that criminal activity by the President can never rise to the level of "high Crimes and Misdemeanors." And, finally, failing to examine these allegations leaves in doubt charges of criminal misconduct against the President. Although the Senate does not sit as a criminal court, a condemnation or exoneration "by silence" would be unfair to both the President and to the American people.

The House Managers argue in Article I that the President committed the crime of perjury while testifying before the Federal Grand Jury on August 17, 1998. They argue in Article II that the President committed the crime of obstruction of justice in the Jones case. After considering the evidence and the arguments of the House Managers and the White House counsels, I believe that the House Managers have not shown, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the President is guilty of the alleged crimes.

It is without dispute that the House Managers have the burden of proof. It is also without dispute that each Senator has the right individually to determine what constitutes the appropriate burden of proof. Because of the gravity of this Impeachment process, but, more significantly, because of the urging of the House Managers, I believe that a standard of beyond a reasonable doubt should be used. This is the standard used in the prosecution of criminal cases.

Article I alleges that the President committed perjury before the Grand Jury by knowingly making false, material statements. The first great hurdle that the House Managers must overcome is the fact that the House refused to adopt an article of impeachment regarding the President's testimony at the Jones deposition. However one characterizes these two statements under oath, no one can argue that the President was more truthful at the Jones deposition. Most, if not all, would argue that he was considerably less truthful at the Jones deposition. This discrepancy fatally undercuts the contention that this Article constitutes "high Crimes and Misdemeanors," and it seriously erodes the claim that the President committed the crime of perjury before the Grand Jury. Unlike the Jones deposition, the President admitted up front in his Grand Jury testimony that he had engaged in "inappropriate intimate behavior" with Ms. Lewinsky while they were "alone".

Confronted with this preemptive statement by the President, the Article generally alleges perjury without citing specific statements from the Grand Jury testimony and leaves the House Managers with the task of sifting through the record to suggest examples of the President's alleged perjury. They suggest four general areas.

First, they point to discrepancies between the testimony of the President and Monica Lewinsky about intimate details of their relationship. This is a difficult proposition to prove without corroborating evidence, and the House Managers offer none. Moreover, some of these details, such as the number of times they engaged in sexual banter on the phone, are just not material.

Second, the House Managers attempt to ignore the President's preliminary statement and argue that he adopted the "perjurious" testimony of his Jones deposition. This is simply not true. To make this assertion, the House Managers use the President's Grand Jury testimony that "I was determined to walk through the mind field of this deposition without violating the law, and I believe I did." But, the President's peremptory statement clearly indicated that he was not vouching for the facts of his Jones deposition. The President's statement expresses his state of mind. It is not an affirmation of the Jones testimony. Not even Independent Counsel Starr alleged that the President committed perjury in this way.

Third, the House Managers allege that the President's silence, while his counsel made representations about the Lewinsky affidavit, constitutes perjury. This novel theory of "unspoken perjury" fails from the lack of any conclusive evidence concerning the President's state of mind at this time. Such evidence is necessary to prove the specific intent to establish the crime.

Fourth, the House Managers alleged that the President committed perjury when he denied his involvement in the obstruction of justice, particularly his alleged involvement in the exchange of gifts between Monica Lewinsky and Betty Currie. This topic will be discussed in more detail with respect to Article II. At this juncture, it is sufficient to note that the House Managers have not presented evidence to indicate beyond a reasonable doubt that the President committed perjury.

Fifth, the House Managers allege that the President committed perjury when he denied "coaching" Betty Currie. Again, this issue will be addressed in more detail with respect to Article II. But, this allegation also fails from the absence of persuasive evidence establishing the President's specific intent in conducting this conversation with Ms. Currie.

Finally, the House Managers allege that the President committed perjury when he gave false information to his aides about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. This too raises the issue of the President's state of mind. His Grand Jury testimony expressed his believe that he tried to say things that were true. He acknowledged that he misled, but he asserted that he tried not to lie. To prove that these statements are perjurious, the House Managers had to prove that the President had the necessary specific intent. They have not done so.

Article II alleges that the President obstructed justice. The article sets forth seven "acts" which the House Managers argue the President used to implement this "scheme."

Three of these alleged "acts", encouraging Monica Lewinsky to file a false affidavit, urging her to give false testimony, and finding her a job to obtain her silence, crash on an immovable evidentiary rock: Monica Lewinsky's uncontradicted and often repeated statement, "no one ever asked me to lie and I was never promised a job for my silence." The House Managers offered other circumstantial evidence, but this too failed to be persuasive.

The fourth "act" involves the transfer of gifts between Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Currie. Although Ms. Lewinsky's testimony strongly suggests that the President directed Ms. Currie to retrieve the gifts, the two parties to this suggested transaction, the President and Ms. Currie, flatly deny any such conversation. Certainly, there is more than a reasonable doubt based on this conflicting testimony; particularly, since no one has ever impeached Ms. Currie's credibility.

The fifth "act" recharacterizes the President's silence, while his attorney made representations about Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, as obstruction of justice. This allegation fails based on the lack of any conclusive evidence of the President's state of mind.

The sixth "act" involved the purported coaching of Betty Currie by the President after his Jones deposition. This allegation too turns on the President's state of mind. The House Managers argue that the President's intent was to influence the testimony of Ms. Currie as a potential witness. White House counsels argue that the President had no reasonable anticipation that she would be a witness. But, more decisively, they argue that his intent was to confirm his story in anticipation of a media onslaught. The lack of persuasive evidence about his state of mind also undercuts this allegation.

Finally, the last allegation involves the President's purported attempt to influence the testimony of his aides. Again, the House Managers have not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the President intended to make his statement to influence their testimony. There is an equally plausible inference that the President was simply continuing his public campaign to deny his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. This campaign led him to lie to the American public and no one suggests he was then tampering with witnesses. Indeed, as a result of these public statements, it seems unlikely that he would tell his aides anything else.

The House Managers have not sustained their burden of proof in regard to Article II.

It is clearly evident that the facts of the case require acquittal. As such, serious questions can and should be raised about the unwarranted extension of the trial. Given the significant doubts surrounding the case of the House Managers, a motion to dismiss, followed by a debate on censure should have been utilized to properly put an end to these proceedings. Instead, a majority of the Senate accommodated the desire of the House Managers to excessively pursue allegations that were politically damaging to the President. Indeed, had members of the House of Representatives been allowed to consider censure this matter may never have reached the Senate.

We, as a nation and as the Senate, have come to the end of a long and wearisome road. It has wandered through scandal and deception. Many of those who have trod this road, both individuals and institutions, have seen their reputations besmirched. The journey emanated from the reckless conduct of William Jefferson Clinton. But, the passage has also exposed vicious political partisanship and the reckless and relentless exploitation of the powers of the Independent Counsel. In the midst of this dishonor, deception, and rancor, we could have easily lost our way. But, we reached this moment because we have been guided by the Constitution and inspired by the common sense and common decency of the American people, and with such a guide and such inspiration, we will do justice with our votes, whether they be to convict or acquit.

And for my part, the Constitution and the evidence compels me to vote to acquit the President on both Articles of Impeachment.

Reed Will Vote to Acquit President Clinton of Impeachment Charges [DLW -- short version]

(Washington, DC); U.S. Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) indicated this morning that he will vote to acquit President William J. Clinton of Impeachment charges when the Senate considers two articles of impeachment in votes expected later today.

"The Senate is now preparing to bring closure to a troubling period in our Nation's history. Americans deserve time to heal and move forward,"said Reed.

"In the midst of this dishonor, deception, and rancor, we could have easily lost our way. But, we reached this moment because we have been guided by the Constitution and inspired by the common sense and common decency of the American people," Reed said in his statement.

"And for my part, the Constitution and the evidence compels me to vote to acquit the President on both articles of Impeachment," concluded Reed.

Below are selected and revised remarks from Senator Reed's statement on his vote on the charges against President Clinton (Senator Reed's full statement is available upon request):

The Senate will bring to a close more than a year of controversy which has left the American people both frustrated and dismayed. And hopefully, our decision will serve as a means of rededicating the energies of government to the service of the American people. In this endeavor, our solemn duty to the Constitution is paramount.

Conscious of these responsibilities and based on the evidence in the record, I conclude as follows:

The President has disgraced himself and dishonored his office. He has offended the justified expectations of the American people that the Presidency must be above the sordid episodes revealed in the record before us.

However, the House Managers failed to establish that the President's conduct amounts to "high crimes and Misdemeanors" requiring his removal from office in accordance with the Constitution. Moreover, the House Managers also failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the allegations in the Article would constitute the crimes of perjury or obstruction of justice.

Authoritative commentary on the Constitution, together with the structure of the Constitution allowing independent consideration of criminal charges, makes it clear that the term, "high Crimes and Misdemeanors", encompasses conduct which involves the President in the impermissible exercise of the powers of his office to upset the Constitutional order. Moreover, since the essence of impeachment is removal from office rather than punishment for offenses, there is a strong inference that the improper conduct must represent a continuing threat to the people and the Constitution, not an episode that either can be dealt with in the Courts or raises no generalized concerns about the continued service of the President.

Measured against this Constitutional standard, the allegations against the President do not constitute "high Crimes and Misdemeanors."

The uncontradicted facts of the case paint a sordid picture of the President's involvement in a clandestine, consensual affair with a young woman. The House Managers take this tale of deception and betrayal, more soap opera than high drama of State, and urge that it rises to behavior evidencing an impermissible exercise of his powers as President or an impermissible failure to discharge his duties as President which threatens the Constitutional balance of government and can only be remedied by the removal of the President. They urge too much. The allegations, even construed in the most favorable light to the House Managers, do not constitute "high Crimes and misdemeanors" as that term has been consistently interpreted over the course of American history.

After considering the evidence and the arguments of the House Managers and the White House counsels regarding both impeachment articles in the Senate -- the charge of perjury while testifying before the grand jury on August 17, 1998 and the charge of obstruction of justice in the Jones case -- I believe that the House Managers have not shown, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the President is guilty of the alleged crimes.

It is without dispute that the House Managers have the burden of proof. It is also without dispute that each Senator has the right individually to determine what constitutes the appropriate burden of proof. Because of the gravity of this Impeachment process, but, more significantly, because of the urging of the House Managers, a standard of beyond a reasonable doubt should be used. This is the standard used in the prosecution of criminal cases.

In specific regard to the charges of obstruction of justice, the article sets forth several "acts" which the House Managers argue the President used to implement this "scheme."

Three of these alleged "acts", encouraging Monica Lewinsky to file a false affidavit, urging her to give false testimony, and finding her a job to obtain her silence, crash on an immovable evidentiary rock: Monica Lewinsky's uncontradicted and often repeated statement, "no one ever asked me to lie and I was never promised a job for my silence." The House Managers offered other circumstantial evidence, but this too failed to be persuasive.

Another "act" involves the transfer of gifts between Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Currie. Although Ms. Lewinsky's testimony strongly suggests that the President directed Ms. Currie to retrieve the gifts, the two parties to this suggested transaction, the President and Ms. Currie, flatly deny any such conversation. Certainly, there is more than a reasonable doubt based on this conflicting testimony; particularly, since no one has ever impeached Ms. Currie's credibility. An additonal "act" involved the purported coaching of Betty Currie by the President after his Jones deposition. This allegation turns on the President's state of mind. The House Managers argue that the President's intent was to influence the testimony of Ms. Currie as a potential witness. White House counsels argue that the President had no reasonable anticipation that she would be a witness. But, more decisively, they argue that his intent was to confirm his story in anticipation of a media onslaught. The lack of persuasive evidence about his state of mind defeat this allegation.

The House Managers have not sustained their burden of proof in regard to Article II.

It is clearly evident that the facts of the case require acquittal. As such, serious questions can and should be raised about the unwarranted extension of the trial. Given the significant doubts surrounding the case of the House Managers, a motion to dismiss, followed by a debate on censure should have been utilized to properly put an end to these proceedings. Instead, a majority of the Senate accommodated the desire of the House Managers to excessively pursue allegations that were politically damaging to the President. Indeed, had members of the House of Representatives been allowed to consider censure this matter may never have reached the Senate.

We, as a nation and as the Senate, have come to the end of a long and wearisome road. It has wandered through scandal and deception. Many of those who have trod this road, both individuals and institutions, have seen their reputations besmirched. The journey emanated from the reckless conduct of William Jefferson Clinton. But, the passage has also exposed vicious political partisanship and the reckless and relentless exploitation of the powers of the Independent Counsel. In the midst of this dishonor, deception, and rancor, we could have easily lost our way. But, we reached this moment because we have been guided by the Constitution and inspired by the common sense and common decency of the American people, and with such a guide and such inspiration, we will do justice with our votes, whether they be to convict or acquit.

And for my part, the Constitution and the evidence compels me to vote to acquit the President on both Articles of Impeachment.

(For a copy of Senator Reed's full statement on the impeachment votes, please contact Jodi Bennett at 202-224-2642 or Sen. Reed's website at WWW.senate.gov)

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